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INTRODUCTION 
Alaska’s Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to privacy.1 This 
Article examines Alaska’s right to privacy in the context of a police 
officer’s authority to request identification from a passenger during a 
routine traffic stop.  
Take, for example, this potential scenario: a police officer stops a 
vehicle for a routine traffic offense, such as a non-functioning license 
plate light. There is no doubt that the officer has authority to stop a 
vehicle in such circumstances; the officer has personally observed an 
infraction of the traffic code. Nothing about the observed infraction, 
however, implicates a passenger of the vehicle in any unlawful activity. 
During the stop, the officer requests identification from all passengers 
because of a standard investigative practice to make a blanket request in 
all traffic stops. Once the officer obtains the passenger’s identification, 
the officer runs her name and information through the state law 
enforcement database system, checking for outstanding warrants and 
any parole or probationary status. Occasionally, the request yields 
information that permits the officer to arrest an individual who 
otherwise has done nothing indicative of criminal activity and merely 
had the misfortune to be sitting next to someone who failed to 
 
Assistant district attorney in Fairbanks, Alaska; former law clerk to the 
Honorable Michael A. MacDonald of the Superior Court of the State of 
Alaska. Special thanks to Judge MacDonald. This article would not have been 
possible without his mentoring, encouragement, and insight. Any opinions 
expressed in this Article are those of the author. This Article is not a policy 
statement of the Criminal Division of the State of Alaska, Department of Law. 
 1.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed.”). 
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illuminate their license plate light. 
The United States Supreme Court has gradually expanded the 
authority of police officers over both drivers and passengers during 
routine traffic stops. During a traffic stop, police officers may inquire 
into matters unrelated to the stop, order drivers and passengers to exit 
the vehicle,2 and conduct a pat down search of both the driver and any 
passenger if the officer reasonably concludes that the individual is 
armed and dangerous.3 Although the issue of requesting a passenger’s 
identification has never been squarely presented to the Supreme Court, 
many jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have ruled that police 
may also request identification and run a criminal background check on 
passengers as a routine matter in every traffic stop.4 
However, the Alaska Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, 
explicitly guarantees the right to privacy.5 This constitutional provision 
establishes a limit to police authority not found at the federal level or in 
most other states. With that in mind, this Article examines whether the 
Alaska Constitution permits a police officer to request identification 
from a passenger during a routine traffic stop when the request is not 
related to the justification for the stop, when the officer has no 
reasonable suspicion of criminality, and when no other circumstances 
indicate a legitimate need to obtain identification. Part I begins by 
examining the law in other jurisdictions, including the federal courts 
and the courts of other states that have addressed the issue. Part II then 
examines whether the additional privacy protections found in the 
Alaska Constitution, as applied and interpreted by Alaska courts, 
impose a limit on police authority to ask for a passenger’s identification. 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the Alaska Constitution does not 
allow law enforcement officers to request identification from passengers 
in a vehicle during a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of 
criminality or other circumstantial justification for the request.  
I. OVERVIEW OF LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed whether a 
police officer may request identification from, or conduct a criminal 
background check on, passengers in a vehicle during a routine traffic 
stop absent reasonable suspicion of criminality. Every United States 
 
 2.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam); 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). 
 3.  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111–12; Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009). 
 4.  See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 5.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
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Circuit Court to address the issue has found that the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution allows both the request 
for identification and the criminal check, as long as the underlying 
traffic stop is not unreasonably extended. 6  State courts that have 
addressed the issue have approved various outcomes under their own 
constitutions, from allowing requests for identification and criminal 
checks as a matter of course, 7  to allowing officers to request 
identification but not run criminal checks,8 to forbidding any questions 
about a passenger’s identity. 9  The Alaska Supreme Court has not 
decided the issue under the Alaska Constitution. 
A.  Routine Traffic Stops and Terry v. Ohio 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution protect against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.10 The United States Supreme Court 
recently confirmed that a traffic stop qualifies as a seizure, reasoning 
that the driver and passengers are effectively seized for the duration of 
the stop.11 
An officer who personally observes a traffic infraction has probable 
cause for a traffic stop.12 Routine traffic stops, even those supported by 
 
 6.  See infra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that every circuit to 
address the issue has found no Fourth Amendment violation when an officer 
requests passenger identification and conducts a criminal check). 
 7.  See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning 
behind allowing routine requests for passenger identification and accompanying 
criminal checks). 
 8.  See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (discussing states that allow 
requests for passenger identification but either have not addressed or do not 
allow criminal checks). 
 9.  See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing states that 
forbid routine requests for passenger identification). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14 
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other 
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated.”). 
 11.  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (quoting Brendlin v. 
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007)). 
 12.  See, e.g., Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) 
(ruling that officer had probable cause to stop defendant who was trying to start 
a stalled snow machine on the sidewalk in violation of the traffic code); Williams 
v. State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that trooper had 
probable cause to stop defendant since evidence established that the driver was 
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probable cause, are considered “a species of investigative stop rather 
than a formal arrest.”13 The principles of Terry v. Ohio,14 a seminal case 
that limited the scope and duration of investigative stops, therefore 
mandate that “a traffic stop ‘must be temporary and [must] last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop’.”15 If a 
police officer’s investigation exceeds these boundaries, either in 
duration, manner, or scope, the stop becomes unreasonable and 
constitutionally invalid.16 
In the course of a traffic stop, it is not considered an unreasonable 
search and seizure for a police officer to ask the driver to “produce 
routine driving documents.” 17  Several state courts have identified a 
driver’s license, proof of insurance, and the vehicle’s registration as 
routine driving documents.18 A computer check to verify the validity of 
routine driving documents does not unreasonably expand the scope or 
duration of a valid traffic stop.19 
Prior case law confirms the Supreme Court’s recent holding that a 
traffic stop is a seizure that must comport with the principles of Terry v. 
Ohio.20 Accordingly, the scope and duration of the stop must not be 
prolonged by police conduct unrelated to the stop.21 However, federal 
and state courts have reached different conclusions regarding how these 
principles apply when an officer conducts a check for outstanding 
 
violating taillight regulations). 
 13.  Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (citing 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440–41 (1984)). 
 14.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 15.  Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 16.  Id. at 625. 
 17.  Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage, 112 P.3d 676, 678 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Maldonado, 
356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2001)). The United States Supreme Court, in dicta, has 
approved the practice of requesting identification from drivers during a routine 
traffic stop. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (noting that during 
routine traffic stops, “licenses and registration papers are subject to inspection”). 
 18.  Clark, 112 P.3d at 678–79 (citing Chang v. State, 608 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2004)); State v. Prince, 101 P.3d 332, 334 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004); Maysonet 
v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Hoang, 6 P.3d 602, 
606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Campbell v. State, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo. 2004). 
 19.  See Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (“By 
calling dispatch to check on the status of the license, [the officer] did not 
unreasonably expand the scope or duration of the stop.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 20.  See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (internal citations 
omitted) (“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop 
entails a seizure of the driver even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief.”). 
 21.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968). 
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warrants on the passenger’s identification during a traffic stop. 
B.  Rights of Passengers Under Federal Law 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent holding that a traffic stop 
constitutes a seizure applies to both the driver as well as all 
passengers.22 Because a traffic stop impacts a passenger’s constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable seizures, a passenger has standing to 
challenge an illegal stop or the unreasonable expansion of an initially 
lawful stop.23 
The Court has found that routine traffic stops “resemble, in 
duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in 
Terry.”24 However, given the potential dangers of traffic stops, the Court 
determined that officers can minimize the risk of harm to police and the 
occupants of a vehicle if they take unquestioned control of the 
situation.25 Because of the inherent dangers present in routine traffic 
stops, the Court has allowed officers to take additional protective 
measures.26 
Four Supreme Court decisions cumulatively apply and clarify Terry 
in a traffic-stop setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms,27 Maryland v. Wilson,28 
Brendlin v. California,29 and Arizona v. Johnson.30 
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court addressed the question of 
whether ordering the driver to get out of the car after a lawful stop “was 
reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment.”31 When 
an officer stopped Mimms for an expired license plate, the officer 
noticed a bulge under Mimms’ jacket.32 Fearful for his safety, the officer 
frisked Mimms and discovered a loaded revolver. 33  Mimms was 
immediately arrested.34 In assessing the constitutionality of the officer’s 
actions, the Court addressed the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, 
 
 22.  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984). 
 25.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (quoting Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981)). 
 26.  See, e.g., Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330–32 (discussing Supreme Court 
precedents authorizing officer safety measures during traffic stops). 
 27.  434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). 
 28.  519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
 29.  551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
 30.  555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
 31.  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. 
   32.  Id. at 107. 
   33.  Id. 
   34.  Id. 
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weighing the need to protect an officer’s safety with an individual’s 
right to “personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.”35 Because of the potential risks and dangers an officer faces 
approaching a person seated in an automobile, the Court found it 
reasonable to allow officers to avoid unnecessary risks in the course of 
duty. 36  The Court reasoned that the public interest in officer safety 
outweighed such a “de minimis” intrusion into the driver’s personal 
liberty. 37 The Court held that it is constitutional for police officers to 
order a driver out of his vehicle. Furthermore, the Court held that an 
officer may conduct a pat down search of the driver if the officer 
reasonably concludes that the driver “might be armed and presently 
dangerous.”38 
Maryland v. Wilson extended the Mimms rule to apply to passengers 
as well as drivers.39 Wilson was a passenger in a vehicle being pursued 
for speeding and tag violations.40 During the pursuit, the officer noticed 
that Wilson kept nervously looking out the window, then ducking down 
and disappearing before popping his head back up.41 Upon stopping the 
vehicle, the officer noticed that Wilson was nervous and sweaty.42 When 
Wilson exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground.43 In 
extending the Mimms rule to allow officers to order passengers to exit 
the vehicle during a traffic stop, the Court again emphasized concerns 
for officers’ safety during traffic stops.44 The Court noted that while both 
drivers and passengers can pose dangers to police officers, there is an 
increased intrusion on passengers’ personal liberty, since there is less 
probable cause or reason to stop or detain a passenger, who, unlike the 
 
   35.  Id. at 109. 
   36.  Id. at 110 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)). The Court cited a 
study showing that “approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 
police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.” Id. (citing Allen P. 
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings – A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 
& POLICE SCI. 93, 93 (1963)). The Court acknowledged “that not all these assaults 
occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have before expressly declined to 
accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to 
officers than other types of confrontations.” Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)). “Indeed, it appears ‘that a significant percentage of 
murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.’” Id. 
(quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5). 
 37.  Id. at 111. 
 38.  Id. at 112. 
 39.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 410–11. 
 43.  Id. at 411. 
 44.  Id. at 413. 
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driver, has not committed a vehicular offense. 45 Nevertheless, the only 
change in the passenger’s circumstance occurs in ordering the passenger 
to step outside the vehicle because the passenger was already detained 
by the traffic stop.46 The Court posited that ordering passengers to get 
out of a stopped car may prevent them from accessing concealed 
weapons inside the vehicle.47 Furthermore, the Court recognized that 
any threat to officer safety during a traffic stop arises not out of the 
driver’s fear of receiving a traffic ticket, but from the possibility of a 
more serious crime being uncovered during the stop.48 Passengers and 
drivers alike may be motivated to inflict violence on an officer under 
those circumstances. 49  Taking into account these considerations, the 
Court held that an officer may order passengers to exit a car during a 
traffic stop.50 
Recently, Brendlin v. California held that passengers are seized to the 
same extent as a driver during a routine traffic stop, and therefore they 
have standing to “challenge the constitutionality of a stop.”51  Brendlin 
was a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop.52 Suspecting that 
Brendlin had dropped out of parole supervision, the police officers 
asked him to identify himself. 53  When reinforcements arrived, the 
officers ordered Brendlin out of the car and placed him under arrest.54 
Brendlin, the driver, and the car all possessed items used for the 
production of methamphetamine. 55  In its reasoning, the Court 
acknowledged that drivers and passengers alike are curtailed by a traffic 
stop and the intrusion on privacy does not distinguish between drivers 
and passengers. 56  Accordingly, passengers have equal standing to 
challenge a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable 
passenger in a car that has just been stopped by police would 
understand that the police officer’s control of the situation prevented 
them from exiting the car without police permission.57 He would not 
“have believed himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the 
 
 45.  Id. The Court cited statistics to prove that “traffic stops may be 
dangerous encounters.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 46.  Id. at 413–14. 
 47.  Id. at 414. 
   48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 415. 
 51.  Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). 
 52.  Id. at 252. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 257. 
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police and himself;” consequently, a passenger is seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop.58 
Finally, in Arizona v. Johnson, the Supreme Court applied Terry to 
pat downs during traffic stops. 59  Johnson was a passenger in an 
automobile pulled over for an expired registration.60 During the traffic 
stop, an officer noticed Johnson was nervous and observed several signs 
that Johnson might have been involved in criminal activity.61 For his 
safety, the officer conducted a pat down, during which he discovered a 
gun.62 Applying the holding in Terry that to move from a stop to a frisk 
the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the stopped person is 
armed and dangerous, the Court ruled the pat down during the traffic 
stop lawful.63 
In summary, without offending the Fourth Amendment, a lawful 
traffic stop allows police officers to: inquire “into matters unrelated to 
the justification for the traffic stop”;64 “order the driver to get out of the 
vehicle”;65 “order passengers to get out of the car”;66 conduct a pat down 
search of the driver if the officer reasonably concludes that the driver is 
armed and dangerous;67 and conduct a pat down search of a passenger if 
the officer reasonably concludes that the passenger is armed and 
dangerous.68 
The Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutionality of “stop 
and identify” statutes.69 State laws requiring suspects to state their name 
during a valid Terry stop have been upheld as consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.70 
The request for a suspect’s name is directly related “to the purpose, 
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of criminal 
sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a 
 
 58.  Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). 
 59.  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 324, 331 (2009). 
 60.  Id. at 327. 
 61.  See id. at 328 (observing clothing and behavior consistent with gang or 
criminal activity and weapon possession). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 327, 329. 
 64.  Id. at 333. 
 65.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam). 
 66.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). 
 67.  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112. 
 68.  Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327. 
 69.  See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humbolt Cnty., 542 U.S. 
177, 187–88 (2004) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2003)) (upholding a 
2003 Nevada statute that required any person lawfully detained to “identify 
himself, but [the person] may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of 
any peace officer”). 
 70.  Id. at 187-88. 
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legal nullity.”71 Further, the request does not directly change the stop 
itself in terms of duration or location.72  The Court noted that Terry 
imposed certain limitations on an investigative stop, requiring that the 
stop be “justified at its inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified’ the initial stop.”73 Under these principles, 
an officer cannot arrest a suspect for failing to produce identification if 
the officer’s purpose in asking for identification does not bear a 
reasonable relation to the purpose of the stop.74  
In response to the argument that a statute requiring disclosure of 
one’s identity to a police officer violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination, the Court declined to address 
whether the privilege applies when “furnishing identity at the time of a 
stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed 
to convict the individual of a separate offense.”75 The Court instead held 
more narrowly that the Fifth Amendment did not apply where 
“petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any 
articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to 
incriminate him, or that it ‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute’ him.”76 The petitioner refused to reveal his identity 
simply because he felt the officer was not entitled to know his name, not 
because he saw any possibility or reason that his name would be used 
against him in a criminal case. 77  Although the court acknowledged 
“petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to disclose his 
identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada 
Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the 
disclosure would tend to incriminate him.”78 Nevada is one of many 
 
 71.  Id. at 188. (internal citations omitted). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 75.  Id. at 191. 
 76.  Id. at 190 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
 77.  Id. at 190–91. 
 78.  Id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that disclosing his name would 
be the key link in the chain of evidence that would lead to his prosecution, thus 
implicating the Fifth Amendment) (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486). Nevada is 
not the only state with a “stop and identify” statute. At least twenty-three other 
states have similar statutes: ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-2412 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT § 
16-3-103(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 
856.021(2) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2012); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
5/107-14 (2012); IND. CODE § 34-28-5-3.5 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) 
(2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 215.1(A) (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 
84.710(2) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
829 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (Lexis 2012); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-3 
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states with stop and identify statutes. 79 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
whether a police officer can request identification from passengers and 
run a criminal background check without any reasonable suspicion of 
criminality, every United States Circuit Court to address the issue has 
answered in the affirmative.80 
C. State Split: Passengers’ Rights 
Alaska’s appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the 
request for identification from a passenger in a vehicle during a routine 
traffic stop is permitted under the state constitution. Other state courts 
around the country are split on the question. 
The majority of states that have decided this issue have concluded 
that the police may request identification from a passenger and may run 
a criminal background check in a traffic stop without violating any 
Fourth Amendment rights, but the requests and background checks 
must not unreasonably prolong the stop. 81   State courts that allow 
 
(2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 
(2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.29 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 
(2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 1983 
(Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2012). Some municipalities also have “stop and 
identify” statutes. See, e.g., Arlington Cnty, Va. Code § 17-13(c) (1957). For 
background on “stop and identify” statutes and their impact on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Peter Koclanes, Unreasonable Seizure: 
“Stop and Identify” Statutes Create an Illusion of Safety by Sacrificing Real Privacy, 57 
FLA. L. REV. 431 (2005); James G. Warner, Dudley Do Wrong: An Analysis of a “Stop 
in Identify” Statute in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 39 AKRON 
L. REV. 245 (2006); William H. Weisman, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: 
Compulsory Identification and the Fallacy of the Hiibel Majority, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
1421 (2006); James L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest 
Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme 
Court’s Decision to Compel Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449 (2005); Note, Stop 
and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 
RUTGERS L.J. 585 (1981); Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: 
Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1057 (1984). 
 79.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2011). 
 80.  See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 2012 WL 48214, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 
10, 2012); United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Stufflebeam v. Harris, 521 F.3d 884, 888 
(8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Kirksey, 485 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1085–86 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 
492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 81.  See, e.g., State v. Ybarra, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
State v. Curiel, 634 P.2d 988, 992 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)) (holding that a request for 
identification and warrant check on a passenger is “incidental to the authorized 
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officers to request identification from a passenger during a traffic stop 
justify the request in a variety of ways, including: (1) that a request for 
passenger identification is not a “search” or “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment or comparable state constitutions;82 (2) that the request is 
justified by legitimate concerns for officer safety;83 (3) that the request is 
 
investigatory stop”); People v. Vibanco, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (holding that a request for a passenger’s identification and a criminal 
background check is permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop); People 
v. Bowles, 226 P.3d 1125, 1129–30 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that a request for a 
passenger’s identification and a criminal check is permissible as long as the 
passenger produces the identification voluntarily); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 
1172–73 (Del. 2010) (holding that, as part of a routine traffic stop, police officers 
may request a passenger’s identification and run a criminal background check as 
long as detention is not unreasonably prolonged); State v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 
151, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a request for a passenger’s 
identification is part of a routine traffic stop); People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947, 
957–58, 963 (Ill. 2008) (holding that a warrant check on passengers is permissible 
so long as check does not unnecessarily prolong the stop and the stop is 
conducted reasonably); Cade v. State, 872 N.E.2d 186, 188–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007) (holding that a request for identification from a passenger is a minimal 
intrusion if the traffic stop was valid); see also State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 
546–47 (Iowa 2004); State v. Hoskins, No. 07-5-1843-1845, 2008 WL 1926727, at *3 
(N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008); State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 804 (N.J. 2008); 
People v. Jones, 779 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); State v. Morgan, 
2002 WL 63196, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2002); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 
862 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Roberson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 642, 646 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Collins, No. CRF 2010 13041, at *9–21 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Oct. 5, 2010) (discussing 
numerous reasons why a request for a passenger’s identification is permissible, 
including officer safety, the minimal nature of the intrusion, necessity in 
completing a seatbelt citation, and the consensual nature of the encounter). 
 82.  See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 919 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“A police officer’s request to a defendant for his identification does not 
constitute detention or seizure” (citing Holden v. State, 877 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004))); State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 2004) (holding 
that a passenger questioned by police was not “seized” under the Fourth 
Amendment because “a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the 
deputy’s request for his ID”); State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 803 (N.J. 2008) 
(holding that a criminal records check “is not a search under the federal or state 
constitutions”); State v. Morgan, 2002 WL 63196, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18, 
2002) (“[a] request for identification . . . is ordinarily characterized as a 
consensual encounter, not a custodial search”) (citing State v. Osborne, 1995 WL 
737913, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995)). 
 83.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 590 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“The 
presence of passengers in a stopped vehicle increases the officers’ risks. . . . 
These risks create a strong interest in officer safety that justifies reasonable safety 
measures that minimally intrude upon the Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectations of motorists.” (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 
(1997))). Cade v. State, 872 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]hen police 
officers have been requested as part of their duties to interact with an individual, 
they should be free to verify that that person does not have known or suspected 
dangerous propensities. This goal can be accomplished by checking the person’s 
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part of the investigation into the traffic violation;84  and (4) that the 
request stems from the officer’s need to collect information about 
witnesses to a traffic stop.85 
Some state courts allow officers to request identification from 
passengers where circumstances warrant it, but deny performing 
blanket criminal checks because such checks are inappropriate without 
reasonable suspicion.86 However, some state courts do not permit 
criminal checks of passengers because they measurably extend the stop 
which would convert the stop into an unlawful seizure.87 
 
name against law enforcement records.” (quoting Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 
980, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006))). 
 84.  See, e.g., State v. Ybarra, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that a request for identification and warrant check on a passenger is “incidental 
to the authorized investigatory stop” (citing State v. Curiel, 634 P.2d 988, 992 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Del. 2010) (holding that 
an officer did “not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop by 
asking [a] passenger for identification and then running a background check”); 
State v. Gutierrez, 611 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (“A reasonable 
investigation of a traffic stop may include asking for a driver’s license and 
registration, requesting a driver to sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver 
about his or her destination and purpose. An officer may engage in similar 
routine questioning of the vehicle’s passengers.” (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 
356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995))); St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806, 819, 822–23 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2006) (“merely asking for a passenger’s identity or identification 
during a routine traffic stop does not require separate reasonable suspicion as to 
the passenger,” but warrant checks on passengers, as opposed to drivers, are not 
such a routine component of traffic stops as to justify prolonging the stop). 
 85.  See State v. Hoskins, 2008 WL 1926727, at *4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 
2008) (“Since passengers in the vehicle are witnesses to the behavior of both the 
officer and the driver, it is only prudent for the officer to ask for their identities 
so that their presence can be documented and they can be contacted later should 
the need arise.”) (citing State v. Brunelle, 766 A.2d 272, 274 (2000)); State v. 
Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 81 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]here is a general public interest in 
attempting to obtain identifying information from witnesses to police-citizen 
encounters.”) 
 86.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(rejecting the idea that obtaining contact information of witnesses justifies a 
warrant check); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(c) (4th ed. 2004) (opining that all passenger criminal 
checks are inappropriate except when (i) the police has reasonable, articulable 
suspicions that a passenger has committed a crime, (ii) the passenger has 
violated a traffic law, or (iii) when the passenger must drive the vehicle 
following the detainment of the original driver). 
 87.  See, e.g., In re M.K.W., 2010 WL 4977141, at *2–3 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
2010) (finding warrant checks on a passenger unconstitutional when they 
measurably extended the length of the stop); see also Piggott v. Commonwealth, 
537 S.E.2d 618, 619–20 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that although the request for 
identification was not a search or seizure, retaining the identification while 
running a warrant check constituted a seizure and was not valid absent 
reasonable suspicion), abrogated by McCain v. Commonwealth, 545 S.E.2d 541, 
546 (Va. 2001). 
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Several courts have held that their own state law does not permit 
police to request identification from passengers absent reasonable 
suspicion or other circumstantial justification. 88  For instance, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that its state constitution’s privacy 
clause “prohibits law enforcement officers from requesting identification 
from passengers for investigative purposes unless there is an 
independent reason that justifies the request.”89 
II.  ALASKA’S LEGACY OF PRIVACY 
Although the United States Constitution establishes minimum 
required protections of individual rights, the Alaska Constitution often 
provides greater protections for liberty and privacy interests.90 Article I, 
Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, like the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 91  But unlike the United States Constitution, the Alaska 
 
 88.  See, e.g., State v. Thompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 534–36 (Ore. 2006) (holding 
that the “defendant was unlawfully seized under Article I, section 9” of the 
Oregon Constitution); State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) (“Once [the police] determined that appellant did not have a driver’s 
license and was not taking any responsibility for the vehicle, requesting 
appellant’s identification, with no suspicion of criminal activity, and then taking 
that identification to run a warrants check was a fishing expedition, thus, 
unreasonable.”); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998) (finding that a request for identification from a passenger “without an 
objective basis for suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal activity, 
slips into the dragnet category of questioning that the Massachusetts 
Constitution] prohibits” (citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 674 N.E.2d 638, 641–
43 (Mass. 1996))); People v. Spicer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 213, 617–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) (recognizing that “the fact [that] the restraint on [the passenger’s] liberty 
was minimal does not make the restraint a reasonable one,” and holding that 
“[i]n circumstances pregnant with coercion” where the passenger “was 
confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she 
was riding was stopped” and the officer requested her identification “[w]ithout 
any explanation or prefatory remarks,” the officer’s “direct request [that] the 
defendant search for and produce a document . . . amounts to an unlawful 
seizure”). 
 89.  State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 207 (Wash. 2004) (holding that “officers 
[may] engage passengers in conversation. . . . [but when the] interaction 
develops into an investigation, it runs afoul of [the] state constitution unless 
there is justification for the intrusion”). 
 90.  Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 245 (Alaska 2006) 
(stating that the “[court has] specifically recognized that Alaska’s guarantee of 
privacy is broader than the federal constitution’s”). 
 91.  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other 
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. The Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution is virtually identical, although the Alaska provision 
adds the words “and other property.” 
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Constitution also contains an explicit right to privacy.92 Article I, Section 
22 of the Alaska Constitution states: “The right of the people to privacy 
is recognized and shall not be infringed.”93 The effect of Article I, Section 
22 is to make privacy a specifically enumerated right in Alaska.94 The 
Alaska Constitution’s express protection of privacy has been interpreted 
by Alaska courts to protect citizens against “unwanted intrusions by the 
State” in a manner that is more expansive than the privacy right 
protected under the federal constitution.95 
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy 
granted by Article I, Section 22 can be used as a justification for giving 
the search protections of § 14 a “liberal interpretation.”96 The Alaska 
Supreme Court has also warned that “[f]ederal decisions dealing with 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution . . . should 
not be regarded as determinative of the scope of Alaska’s right to 
privacy amendment, since no such express right is contained in the 
United States Constitution.”97 However, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
at least considered the Supreme Court’s rulings on the Fourth 
Amendment in addressing the constitutionality of investigative stops.98 
Although federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148 
(Alaska 1977) (emphasizing the Alaska Constitution’s explicit guarantee of 
privacy). 
 93.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 94.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 501 (Alaska 1975) (noting that this 
enumeration “does not, in and of itself, yield answers concerning what scope 
should be accorded this right to privacy”); see also Jeffrey M. Kaban, Note, 
Alaska, the Last Frontier of Privacy: Using the State Constitution to Eliminate 
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1309, 1318 (2004) (noting the importance 
of the right to privacy in finding broader rights under the state constitution). 
 95.  State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007) 
(quoting Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska 
1989)); Woods & Rhode, 565 P.2d at 149 (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 514–15). 
 96.  Wortham v. State, 641 P.2d 223, 224–25 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), aff’d, 
666 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1983)); see also Shardul Desai, Note, Pretextual Searches and 
Seizures: Alaska’s Failure to Adopt a Standard, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 235, 246 (2006) 
(discussing the additional search and seizure protections present in Alaska due 
to the express constitutional guarantee of privacy (citing Anchorage Police Dep’t 
Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001))). 
 97.  State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874–75 (Alaska 1978). 
 98.  For example, in Anchorage v. Cook, the court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Pennsylvania v.  Mimms, holding that “minimal intrusion 
was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement and, 
therefore, not violative of either the fourth amendment [or the Alaska 
Constitution].” 598 P.2d 939, 942 (Alaska 1979). In Erickson v. State, the court 
declined to follow the holding in Maryland v. Wilson that a police officer can 
order the driver and the passengers out of a car that the officer has stopped for a 
routine traffic violation, without need of any further justification, and narrowly 
ruled on case-specific grounds. 141 P.3d 356, 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
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interpretation of the Alaska’s constitutional privacy right is persuasive, 
it is not controlling; it is likely that in Alaska, as in Washington state, 
law enforcement officers are prohibited from requesting identification 
from passengers unless there is an independent reason that justifies the 
request. 
However, Alaska’s right to privacy is not absolute, 99  and the 
request for a passenger’s identification could be justified after balancing 
the detainee’s privacy interest with the countervailing state interests. 
Alaska has found such requests reasonable where the officer has 
reasonable suspicion of criminality,100 the passenger has committed a 
traffic infraction,101 or the passenger intends to take possession of the 
vehicle after the driver’s arrest.102 But the right to privacy does protect 
against indiscriminate requests for passenger identification where the 
request cannot be justified as anything other than routine police 
procedure.  
A.  A Request for Identification from a Passenger Is a Seizure in 
Alaska 
When analyzing the constitutionality of a request for identification 
from a passenger during a routine traffic stop under the Alaska 
Constitution, courts must first determine whether the passenger was 
seized when the police officer requested identification. If a search or 
 
 99.  See Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974) (stating that privacy 
may sometimes be held subordinate to the constitutional power to protect health 
and welfare). 
 100.  See, e.g., Hartman v. State, Dep’t of Admin., 152 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Alaska 
2007) (finding that the police may make a stop if they have “a reasonable 
suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or 
property has recently occurred” (quoting Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 
(Alaska 1976))). 
 101.  See, e.g., Marker v. State, 2006 WL 1720079, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. June 
21, 2006) (finding that officers had authority to stop a vehicle and request 
identification from both the driver and the passenger where both parties had 
committed a traffic infraction by failing to wear a seatbelt); Larson v. State, 669 
P.2d 1334, 1335–36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (finding that an officer was justified in 
conducting an investigatory stop and demanding identification from a 
passenger where the officer first observed the passenger driving the car 
erratically, and then switching seats with another occupant of the car). 
 102.  According to section 13.02.345(c) of the Alaska Administrative Code 
(2012), police are authorized to release a vehicle to a person of the driver’s choice 
in lieu of impoundment upon the driver’s arrest, so long as the proposed driver 
is a legally licensed driver. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 13, § 13.02.345(c) (2012); see 
also, McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 250 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (finding that 
officers were authorized to request identification from a passenger who sought 
to remove the driver’s property from a vehicle before the vehicle was 
impounded). 
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seizure did occur, the next step is to determine whether the request for 
identification is within an exception to the warrant requirement. 
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
passengers are seized to the same extent as a driver during a routine 
traffic stop.103 In the majority opinion of Brendlin v. California, Justice 
Souter noted that a passenger in a car that has just been stopped by 
police would understand “the police officers to be exercising control to 
the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police 
permission.”104  Since a reasonable person would not “have believed 
himself free to ‘terminate the encounter’ between the police and 
himself,” a passenger is seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment during a traffic stop.105 
Thus a passenger is seized when the car in which he or she is riding 
is stopped for a traffic violation. A reasonable person would not “believe 
he or she was free to go”106 when the police officer approaches the 
vehicle, informs the occupants that the driver has committed a traffic 
infraction, and asks for identification from the driver and all passengers. 
Although the officer may be able to make the same request of a person 
on the street without conducting a seizure, 107  there are significant 
distinctions between pedestrians and automobile passengers. There is “a 
greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile 
than . . . by pedestrian or other modes of travel.”108 A passenger in an 
automobile does not have the realistic option of simply walking away 
when confronted by undesired police contact.109 Because a reasonable 
person who is a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation 
would not believe he or she is free to go when a police officer requests 
identification, the passenger is seized by virtue of the stop. The request 
for identification is not necessarily an additional seizure. 
 
 103.  See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 257–58 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)). 
 106.  Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 364 (Alaska 1983). 
 107.  See Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“mere 
request for identification does not automatically render the stop a seizure, where 
it does not appear that the identification was retained for an unnecessarily long 
time”). The key factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred is 
“whether or not a reasonable person would believe he or she was free to go.” 
Waring, 670 P.2d at 364. Because the average person would feel obligated to 
respond to a police officer’s questions, an encounter amounts to a seizure only if 
the police officer adds to those inherent pressures with conduct that a reasonable 
person would view as threatening or offensive even if coming from another 
private citizen. Id. 
 108.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 109.  See State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 206 (Wash. 2004) (elaborating on the 
rationale suggested in Prouse). 
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But when there are greater privacy protections by virtue of a state 
constitution’s privacy clause, greater expectations of privacy may make 
the request for identification a search or seizure. In State v. Rankin,110 the 
Washington Supreme Court held that because of the Washington 
Constitution’s privacy clause, “passengers are unconstitutionally 
detained when an officer requests identification ‘unless other 
circumstances give the police independent cause to question [the] 
passengers.’” 111 Because of the added protections of Washington’s 
privacy clause, a police officer’s request for a passenger’s identification 
violated the right of privacy unless the officer had an independent basis 
for the request.112 
As the Rankin court recognized, a state constitution’s privacy clause 
may grant greater rights and create greater expectations of privacy. 
Those higher expectations of privacy are present in Alaska.113 Although 
some states have held that a request for identification is not a search or 
seizure,114  the additional privacy protections afforded by the Alaska 
Constitution make such a finding inapposite in Alaska. 
Because under the Alaska Constitution a request for identification 
from a passenger during a traffic stop is a search and seizure, and 
because the request is made without a warrant, the request must meet 
an exception to the warrant requirement if it is to be constitutionally 
permissible. 
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
Warrantless searches and seizures are considered per se 
unreasonable, and courts will uphold a warrantless search or seizure 
only if it satisfies “one of the well-established and specifically defined 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111. Id. at 205 (quoting State v. Larson, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (Wash. 1980)). 
 112. Id. at 203. “[T]he freedom from disturbance in ‘private affairs’ afforded to 
passengers in Washington by article I, section 7 [of the Washington Constitution] 
prohibits law enforcement officers from requesting identification from 
passengers for investigative purposes unless there is an independent reason that 
justifies the request.” Id. at 207. 
 113.  See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 
(Alaska 2007) (discussing the more robust right to privacy guaranteed by the 
Alaska Constitution as opposed to any federal right to privacy). 
 114.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2004) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s identity, and 
therefore no unreasonable intrusion when an officer asks for a passenger’s 
identification); State v. Gonzalez, 919 So.2d 702, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“A 
police officer’s request to a defendant for his identification does not constitute 
detention or seizure.”). 
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exceptions to the warrant requirement.”115 The Alaska Supreme Court 
has warned that “[i]nherent in the concept of ‘narrowly defined 
exceptions’ is the requirement that a search conducted pursuant to such 
an exception must be no broader or more intrusive than necessary to 
fairly effect the governmental purpose which serves as its 
justification.” 116  The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized the 
following well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement: 
 A search of abandoned property117 
 A search in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon118 
 A search to prevent the destruction of evidence119 
 A search of a movable vehicle120 
 A  pre-incarceration inventory search121 
 A search pursuant to voluntary consent122 
 A search conducted for the purpose of rendering 
emergency aid123 
 A stop and frisk124 
 
 115.  Gallmeyer v. State, 640 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 116.  Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 735 (Alaska 1979) (internal citation 
omitted) (finding the correctional officer’s “pat-down” was constitutional, but 
the officer’s search of the balloon found on the individual exceeded the scope of 
the search). 
 117.  Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 840 (Alaska 1975) (citing Abel v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 217, 240 (1960)) (remanding to find whether the search of an 
intoxicated man’s wallet in a public tavern was incident to a lawful arrest). 
 118.  Id. at 840  (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967)). 
 119.  Finch v. State, 592 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Alaska 1979) (“There must be 
probable cause to believe that evidence is present, and the officers must 
reasonably conclude, from the surrounding circumstances and the information 
at hand, that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before a search warrant 
can be obtained.”). 
 120.  Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1262–63 (Alaska 1978) (finding that the 
movable vehicle exception is essentially a subcategory of the destructible 
evidence exception because vehicles may escape before a warrant is obtained). 
 121.  Reeves, 599 P.2d at 735. (finding that inventory searches are appropriate 
because the state wants (1) to prevent the entry of prohibited or dangerous items 
into the jail, and  (2) to secure the property of the arrestee for safe-keeping). 
 122.  Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (finding defendant 
voluntarily consented to search of his car).  See Clark v. State, 231 P.3d 366, 367 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (“The police may conduct a 
warrantless search based on the voluntary consent of a person who has valid 
control of the place to be searched.”). 
 123.  Schraff, 544 P.2d at 841. 
 124.  Free v. State, 614 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Alaska 1980) (finding pat-down search 
for weapons was valid during an investigatory stop after receiving a reliable tip 
about a potential armed robbery). See also State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (internal citations omitted) (“[A]n investigatory stop is 
differentiated from an arrest on the basis of (1) its purpose, (2) the magnitude of 
the intrusion, and (3) the quantum of information necessary to justify the 
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 A search incident to arrest125 
 A seizure of items in plain view126 
 A search of probationers or parolees authorized by the 
conditions of probation or parole and conducted at the 
direction of a probation or parole officer127 
 A protective search128 
Most of these exceptions do not logically apply when a law 
enforcement official requests identification from a passenger. A 
passenger’s identification is not abandoned property; the passenger is 
not a fleeing felon; there is no danger of destruction of evidence; the 
request is not part of an inventory search; there is no need for 
emergency aid; the search is not conducted incident to arrest; the 
identification is not in plain view; the officer would not know prior to 
the request that the passenger was on probation; and the request was 
not part of a protective search for dangerous persons. If any of the 
exceptions did apply to the particular facts of a case, the request for 
identification could be justified on a case-by-case basis rather than as 
part of a general policy to make a blanket request for identification from 
all passengers in all traffic stops.  
Only the movable vehicle exception, voluntary consent, or a search 
incident to a lawful investigative stop could justify a general policy of 
 
intrusion, i.e., reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.”); State v. 
Wagar, 79 P.3d 644, 647 n.4 (Alaska 2003) (internal citation omitted) (“Not every 
legitimate stop can be accompanied by a frisk. What is needed is a reasonable 
belief at the time of the initiation of the frisk that the suspect may be armed and 
dangerous.”). 
 125.  Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006) (“Search incident to 
lawful arrest allows the warrantless search of the area ‘within [the arrestee’s] 
immediate control’ at the time of the arrest to ensure officer safety and to 
preserve evidence related to the crime.”) (quoting McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 
133 (Alaska 1971)). 
 126.  Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Alaska 1973) (“An officer may seize 
evidence which is legitimately in his plain sight.”). 
 127.  Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1239–44 (Alaska 1977) (finding that 
search of defendant under authority of parole officer was valid). See also Milton 
v. State, 879 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (“A search by a probation 
officer of a probationer’s residence is a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement as long as the search has been authorized by the conditions of 
probation or release, the search is conducted by or at the direction of probation 
authorities, and the search bears a direct relationship to the nature of the crime 
for which the probationer was convicted.”). 
 128.  Earley v. State, 789 P.2d 374, 376 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (“To satisfy the 
protective search doctrine, the state must prove that: ‘(a) the officers must have 
reasonable cause to believe that their safety is in danger before engaging in such 
a search, and (b) the search must be narrowly limited to areas where they could 
find dangerous persons.’”) (quoting Murdock v. State, 664 P.2d 589, 596 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1983)). 
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making a warrantless request for identification from all passengers 
during a traffic stop. Each is considered below. 
1. Movable Vehicle Exception 
Movable vehicle search cases are justified by the notion that 
“warrantless searches must be tolerated because vehicles and evidence 
contained in them might be removed before it is possible to obtain a 
search warrant. Thus, the movable vehicle exception . . . may properly 
be considered to be a subcategory of the destructible evidence 
exception.”129 To qualify for the destructible evidence exemption, “(1) 
[t]here must be probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains 
evidence or contraband and (2) there must be exigent circumstances 
justifying conduct of the search without a warrant.”130 
Neither requirement of the movable vehicle exception is met when 
an officer requests identification from a passenger without 
circumstantial justification. At the outset of a routine traffic stop, an 
officer would have no suspicion, let alone probable cause, that anyone in 
the vehicle other than the driver was engaged in unlawful activity. 
Likewise, there would be no probable cause to believe that a vehicle 
stopped for a traffic infraction contained evidence or contraband that 
would be discovered by requesting a passenger’s identification. And at 
the outset of such a routine traffic stop, there are no exigent 
circumstances that would justify an immediate search without a 
warrant. Because the movable vehicle exception does not justify blanket 
searches of all cars and all passengers in all stops, it cannot justify a 
blanket request for passenger identification in all stops. 
2. Voluntary Consent 
A warrantless search may be conducted pursuant to the voluntary 
consent of an individual “who has valid control of the place to be 
searched.”131 To prove voluntary consent, the State has the burden of 
showing that consent was “unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, 
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.” 132  A person may 
voluntarily consent to a search or seizure that would not otherwise 
satisfy constitutional requirements.133 
 
 129.  Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1262–63 (Alaska 1978). 
 130.  Id. at 1263. 
 131.  Clark v. State, 231 P.3d 366, 367 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); Nason v. State, 
102 P.3d 966, 970–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 132.  Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (quoting Erickson v. State, 
507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973)); accord Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 817 
(Alaska 1988). 
 133.  Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
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When the State relies upon the consent exception, two main issues 
must be determined: (1) whether the defendant actually consented, and 
(2) whether the defendant did so with the requisite voluntariness.134 To 
assess these issues, courts examine the totality of the circumstances.135 
Mere “acquiescence to apparent lawful authority” does not constitute 
voluntary, uncoerced consent to a warrantless search.136 
In Brown v. State,137 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that under the 
specific circumstances of that case, “the officer conducting the traffic 
stop was prohibited from requesting [the defendant’s] permission to 
conduct a search that was (1) unrelated to the basis for the stop and (2) 
not otherwise supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminality.”138 
The court refrained from deciding “whether Article I, Section 14 [of the 
Alaska Constitution] should be interpreted to completely preclude 
requests for searches during a routine traffic stop unless the search is 
related to the ground for the stop or is otherwise supported by a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality,” opting instead for a narrower 
holding based on the “particularly egregious example” presented by 
Brown’s case.139  
Brown was stopped for an equipment violation, but she was never 
informed of the reason for the stop.140 Brown did not know if she was 
suspected of a minor traffic infraction or a more serious crime. 141 
Without explanation, the trooper demanded Brown’s driver’s license, 
and then he went back to his patrol vehicle.142 For all that Brown knew, 
the trooper might have been verifying her identity in preparation for 
arresting her. 
When the trooper returned to Brown’s car, he still refrained from 
telling Brown the reason for the stop.143 Moreover, even though the 
trooper had decided to release Brown with a warning, the trooper gave 
her no indication that she was free to go (or would shortly be free to 
go).144 Instead, the trooper asked Brown to consent to a search of her 
 
 134.  Id. at 613–14. 
 135.  Id. at 614; Nason, 102 P.3d at 971. 
 136.  Schaffer, 988 P.2d at 616; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
227 (1973) (finding that when consent justifies search, consent will be 
determined by voluntariness through the totality of the circumstances). 
 137.  182 P.3d 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 138.  Id. at 626. 
 139.  Id. at 634. 
 140.  Id. at 625. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 627. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
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person and her vehicle for drugs.145 
Because Brown remained ignorant of the reason for the stop, she 
did not know the basis for the trooper’s assertion of authority over 
her.146 Consequently, even if Brown had been familiar with search and 
seizure law, Brown had no way of knowing if she had the right to refuse 
the trooper’s request—indeed she had no way of knowing if the 
trooper’s request to conduct a search was indeed a request or was, 
instead, simply a polite phrasing of a command. Despite the promptness 
of the trooper’s request, Article I,  Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution 
prohibited him from asking for permission to search the car.147  
The court distinguished the circumstances in Brown from U. S. 
Supreme Court cases holding that “absent specific coercive 
circumstances beyond those that normally attend a traffic stop, the 
motorist’s ensuing consent to search will be deemed voluntary.”148 The 
court noted that numerous commentators have criticized the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.149 Because the motorist in Brown remained ignorant of 
the reason for the stop and of the officer’s authority over her, and 
because the request for consent to search was nothing more than a 
fishing expedition unsupported by any individualized suspicion, the 
court recognized that these coercive circumstances precluded a finding 
of voluntary consent.150 
The same coercive circumstances recognized in Brown apply to 
requests for identification from passengers. Although the passengers 
may be aware of the reason for the traffic stop, they remain ignorant of 
the basis for the officer’s authority over them. It is not a crime, nor is it 
suspicious, to be a passenger in a car that is stopped for a traffic 
violation.151 The request for passenger identification serves no logical 
purpose related to the traffic offense; however, a passenger might 
assume that the passengers are required by law to comply with the 
request, especially where the officer makes the request of the driver and 
the passengers simultaneously. Like the driver in Brown, a passenger 
would have “no way of knowing if the trooper’s request . . . was indeed 
 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 634. 
 148.  Id. at 625. 
 149.  Id. at 632. 
 150.  Id. at 634. 
 151.  State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1095 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (“Defendant 
was present solely by virtue of the coincidence [that] he was a passenger in the 
vehicle stopped for a malfunctioning license plate light, and under the 
circumstances, giving the officer no suspicion whatsoever of criminal activity or 
danger of harm from weapons.”). 
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a request or was, instead, simply a polite way of phrasing a 
command.”152 
Although a passenger may freely provide identification to an 
officer, his or her compliance with the officer’s request is mere 
“acquiescence to apparent lawful authority,” not a voluntary, uncoerced 
consent to a warrantless search. Like the driver in Brown, 153  the 
passenger has no way of knowing the officer’s purpose behind 
requesting identification, and no way of knowing if he or she has a 
lawful right to refuse. When law enforcement temporarily detains a 
vehicle they seize the passenger. “In circumstances pregnant with 
coercion,” an officer’s “direct request [that] the defendant search for and 
produce a document”154 vitiates any consent implied by a passenger’s 
voluntary relinquishment of his or her identification. 
3. Investigative Stop 
Upon personally observing a traffic infraction, a police officer has 
probable cause for a traffic stop.155 The principles of Terry v. Ohio156 
require that “a traffic stop ‘must be temporary and [must] last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’”157 A police 
officer’s conduct during the stop must be “‘reasonably related in scope’ 
to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. The stop 
becomes unreasonable—and thus constitutionally invalid—if the 
duration, manner, or scope of the investigation exceeds these 
boundaries.”158 
Alaska has not followed the example of federal courts in giving law 
enforcement officers carte blanche investigatory powers during a 
routine traffic stop. The Alaska Court of Appeals has not adopted the 
holding of Maryland v. Wilson 159  that a police officer may order 
passengers out of a car during a traffic stop without any additional 
justification.160 The Alaska Supreme Court has held that “a licensing 
 
 152.  Brown, 182 P.3d at 634. Some courts have found that an officer may ask 
for identification as long as the circumstances do not suggest that a reasonable 
person would feel obligated to comply. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 919 So.2d 702, 
704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
   153.  Brown, 182 P.3d at 627. 
 154.  People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 155.  Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Williams v. 
State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 156.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 157.  Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 158.  Id. 
   159.  519 U.S. 408, 414–415 (1997). 
 160.  See Erickson v. State, 141 P.3d 356, 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (declining 
to decide whether the Alaska Constitution grants greater protection on this issue 
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statute cannot be used as a means for obtaining information or evidence 
not related to the licensing requirement.”161 And the Alaska Court of 
Appeals has held that a lawful investigatory stop may not be extended 
without reasonable suspicion solely “in the hope that something might 
turn up.”162 
During a traffic stop, an officer may ask the motorist to produce 
“routine driving documents” without unreasonably expanding the 
scope or duration of the traffic stop. 163  Routine driving documents 
include a driver’s license, proof of insurance, and the vehicle’s 
registration.164 A computer check to verify the validity of routine driving 
documents does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a 
valid traffic stop.165 
However, the request for identification and criminal background 
check on a passenger’s license unreasonably expands the scope, and 
therefore the duration, of the traffic stop. Any unconstitutional search or 
seizure, even one lasting only a matter of seconds,166 is a violation of an 
individual’s rights.167 Although the total length of the stop may not be 
per se excessive, any time spent on matters outside the scope of the stop 
is unreasonable. Thus, even when a request for the passenger’s 
identification may have been made within minutes of the initial stop and 
the criminal check could have been completed within minutes, any time 
spent on actions not reasonably related to the initial stop would extend 
 
in light of case-specific reasons that justified ordering the passenger out of the 
car). 
 161.  Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 839 (Alaska 1975). 
 162.  Cousins v. State, 2006 WL 1897112, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. July 12, 2006); 
see also Kaban, supra note 94, at 1320–24. 
 163.  Clark v. Municipality of Anchorage, 112 P.3d 676, 678 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2005) (quoting United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Fallon v. State, 221 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing Brown 
v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008)); see also Clark, 112 P.3d at 678 
(“‘[I]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a valid traffic stop 
for an officer to prolong the stop to immediately investigate and determine if the 
driver is entitled to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the 
driver’s license, insurance, and vehicle registration[.]’”) (emphasis in original). 
 166.  See, e.g., State v. Sloane, 939 A.2d 796, 805 (N.J. 2008) (“An NCIC query 
can produce a response in approximately .05 seconds.”) (citing Press Release, 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 40 Years of NCIC (Jan. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/40-years-of-ncic). 
 167.  Cf. People v. Spicer, 203 CAL. RPTR. 599, 601–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(citation omitted); see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS 
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 6.4.3.1 (2008) (noting that investigative 
techniques and computer checks in particular “prolong the length of a stop until 
the results have been obtained, allowing the police—if the officer so chooses—to 
exploit that period of time to engage in conversation with the detainee . . . and 
otherwise obtain incriminating evidence”). 
HAINES_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012 5:54 PM 
2012 REQUESTING PASSENGER ID  285 
the stop unnecessarily in violation of an individual’s rights. 
A blanket request for passengers’ identification is not “‘reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first 
place.’”168 The traffic stop is justified by the officer’s direct observation 
of a traffic violation. No evidence of the infraction could be gleaned 
from a passenger’s identification. Although an officer could conceivably 
collect witness information in anticipation that witnesses must later be 
summonsed to traffic court or another legal proceeding arising out of 
the police-citizen contact,169 the officer could obtain that information 
merely by asking the passengers for their names and contact 
information, and perhaps even by a request for identification for these 
purposes. But seizing the identification card and then conducting a 
warrant check on the passenger goes beyond the scope of witness 
identification. Moreover, this justification is particularly thin where the 
officer does not issue a citation to the driver for the original traffic 
violation, and there are to be no hearings or further proceedings 
necessitating witness participation. The passengers, as a practical matter, 
have no witness value and are almost never subpoenaed to traffic 
court.170 
C. No Generalized Concern for Officer Safety Outweighs 
Individual Privacy Rights 
Some other jurisdictions allow the request for passenger 
identification on the theory that officer safety concerns justify asking all 
passengers for identification during a traffic stop. Although there are 
significant threats to officer safety that could potentially arise during a 
traffic stop, a generalized concern for “officer safety” may not be used as 
a means of nullifying a constitutional right. As the New Mexico court in 
 
 168.  Brown, 182 P.3d at 625 (internal citation omitted). 
 169.  See State v. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 81–82 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]here is a 
general public interest in attempting to obtain identifying information from 
witnesses to police-citizen encounters. If witnesses are willing to identify 
themselves, they may later be able to assist police in locating the person who 
violated the law. If questions later arise about police conduct during the stop, 
passengers may be able to provide information about what occurred during the 
stop.”); State v. Hoskins, 2008 N.H. Super. LEXIS 7, at *13–15 (N.H. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 7, 2008). But see State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 510–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) (rejecting the idea that obtaining contact information of witnesses justifies 
a warrant check; “[t]he officers could have taken the information they needed 
from appellant’s identification and returned it to him. They did not have to run a 
warrants check to get his name and address.”). 
 170.  See Castle v. State, 999 P.2d 169, 173–74 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (noting 
that the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent 
circumstances are present). 
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Affsprung held: 
 
Defendant’s mere presence in a vehicle with a faulty license 
plate light adds nothing of significance that causes this even 
minimal intrusion to tip the balance in favor of public or 
officer safety over individual [Article I, Section 22] privacy. To 
permit law enforcement officers to ask for and to check out 
passenger identification under these circumstances opens a 
door to the type of indiscriminate, oppressive, fearsome 
authoritarian practices and tactics of those in power that the 
[search and seizure clause] was designed to prohibit.171 
 
An officer’s request for a passenger’s identification and a 
subsequent criminal check of the passenger expands the scope of the 
stop, changes the target of the stop, and prolongs the stop.172 A policy 
that allows officers to indiscriminately obtain identification from 
passengers during a traffic stop encourages the systematic infringement 
of privacy rights. Officers have every incentive to perpetuate this 
systematic infringement because their fishing expedition may yield an 
occasional warrant or probationer. The officer loses nothing if the 
criminal check reveals nothing of interest, but in such an exchange the 
privacy rights of individuals are violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Constitution, in addition to its explicit guarantee of 
privacy, provides more protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures than exists in some other jurisdictions. These provisions secure 
a broader right to privacy than that of the Federal Constitution. 
Because the right to privacy is not absolute, a police officer would 
have authority to request a passenger’s identification where the officer 
has reasonable suspicion of criminality, the passenger has personally 
committed a traffic infraction, or the passenger intends to take 
possession of the vehicle after the driver’s arrest. But an officer has no 
authority under the Alaska Constitution to request a passenger’s 
identification during a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion 
of criminality or other circumstantial justification. The request cannot be 
justified by the traffic stop, by a generalized concern for officer safety, or 
 
 171.  State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088, 1094–95 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
 172.  See United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding 
the scope and duration of a traffic stop must be reasonably related to the 
circumstances that led to the stop in the first place). 
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by a vague argument about collecting witness contact information. And 
although the passenger may in theory have a right to refuse the 
“request,” the inherent imbalance of power present in a traffic stop 
renders the passenger’s seemingly voluntary consent the product of 
coercion. 
The Alaska Constitution does not permit law enforcement officers 
to request identification from vehicle passengers during a routine traffic 
stop without reasonable suspicion of criminality or other circumstantial 
justification. For routine traffic stops in which there is no independent 
justification, a request for passenger identification is constitutionally 
invalid. Although such a request may be valid under the United States 
Constitution and under the law of other states, the Alaska Constitution 
provides privacy and search and seizure protections for passengers that 
prohibit such a request without independent justification.  
